Powered by Blogger.
Showing posts with label Baruch Spinoza. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Baruch Spinoza. Show all posts

Reading One: Enjoying (on William Carlos Williams’ “The Red Wheelbarrow”) [Section 2 of 2]

Tuesday, May 11, 2010

(Continued from here.)

I did an experiment of my own in cultivating awareness and comprehension of a passion of mine - the first of the eight experiments that make up this book. I’m still not an expert on William Carlos Williams. I just love the poem “A Red Wheelbarrow.” Frankly, I love Williams himself, though I don’t know much about him. I love that he was a doctor and a poetthat he never stopped being either and, as far as I know, never wanted to. I love him the way I love the American poet Frank O’Hara for typing up poems on the typewriters in retail stores in Manhattan during his lunch hour and calling the result “Lunch Poems.” Indeed, Williams wrote the poem in question in about two minutes during a house call, looking out the window at the bedside of a young girl patient for whose life he feared.

But I wanted to understand how and why I loved this poem. I wanted to bridge the uncomfortable institutional silence that prevented that job candidate and me from talking about this poem during her interview. I wanted to do more than just love this poem, I wanted to understand my love and in that way to love more powerfully. So I just sat down and wrote longhand several pages responding to the question: “How do I love this poem?” I wanted to construct an adequate idea of the affections I experience in reading this poem and so to transform my joyful passion-“I love this poem”- into an action ”I cultivate the joy that this poem arouses.”

First, here is the poem.


so much depends
upon


a red wheel
barrow


glazed with rain
water

beside the white
chickens

Exhilaration arises at the poem’s apparent simplicity. Sixteen simple words, bare and stark, merely an observation, just a glance, one look at a gardening implement and this is a poem, and a celebrated anthologized poem. The language isn’t fancy or stylized. It is simple. An uncomplicated expression that makes me feel to my core. No quick cuts and dazzling dialogue necessary to intrigue and awaken the jaded. At an outsider art show I once overheard a visitor say, “I could have done this and called it a painting.” The gallery owner standing next to the person said, “Sure, but you didn’t.” Williams did it. Henry Miller writes in Sexus that “Every day we slaughter our finest impulses. That is why we get a heartache when we read those lines written by the hand of a master and recognize them as our own, as the tender shoots which we stifled because we lacked the faith to believe in our own powers.” Anybody could do it. And some people do. Williams did.

My first response to this twenty or so years ago, a response that still arises to this day every time I read this poem, is a simultaneous rush of pain for the tender shoots I have stifled and of gratitude for Williams’ inspiring model of simple courage required to do it. But love also arises with the recognition that the poem is only apparently simple. Williams doesn’t simply say: “Look, I see a red wheelbarrow with rain on it next to some white chickens.” That report itself is made more than bare bones, is given flesh and mystery by the way in which Williams reports, by the “so much depends,” by the line breaks, by the word “glazed.”

At first glance, Williams appears to tell me “so much depends” on ordinary objects, like red wheelbarrows, being there. Maybe this seems obvious enough, but if it is, it’s one of those obvious truths that I can never seem to hear enough. After all, what would crumble to dust in my hands, heart, and head if my world were suddenly drained of ordinary objects: a pencil, a plate, a window pane, a chair, a plum, a cooking pot? Yet do I notice, really notice, such things and feel grateful for them? Not grateful that I possess them, but grateful that they simply are; that they are there making up the material fabric of the universe, quietly weaving themselves into the spiritual and intellectual and emotional fabric of the universes I make for myself and others?
As I wrote that day I noticed that had shifted the emphasis from the value of the object itself to the value of my seeing the object in some particular way; from the object to the relation between me and the object. This is impact of the line breaks.

Four stanzas of two lines each. In each stanza, the first line has three words, and the second has one. In this way Williams prompts us to read his words. He invites us to slow down and read in a new way. It’s just a simple sentence:

“So much depends on a red wheel barrow glazed with rain water beside the white chickens.”

Written out in a line from margin to margin I don’t think I’d read it the same way. It would just be a proposition about some bit of the fabric of the universe. Then I could agree or disagree, if I were even interested enough in it to take a position. But by breaking the lines the way he does, turning a one-line proposition into an eight-line poem with a pattern, Williams does more than just draw special attention to the proposition. He makes us slow down. By doing that he invites us to do what the poet has done and what the poem implicitly suggests is a good thing. It invites us to see the red wheelbarrow and that so much depends on it. On the red wheelbarrow itself, on my slowing down, and on my seeing the red wheelbarrow.

I love this because Williams has worked the creative or generative side of words. We can think of words as relational events that at once create and mark an encounter between ourselves and the world. Often, perhaps even typically, we use language as if words just represent things in the world and don’t do anything to us and that we don’t do anything to the world with them. But Williams now is making them do something to things in the world, including us, and inviting us to read his words with an adequate idea of this creative relational function of language in mind.
The poem encourages me to follow Williams in bringing this red wheelbarrow forth in language.

Recently scientists have come to see the processes of self-generation and self-perpetuation carried out by living systems as a form of cognition, or knowing. We tend to think of cognition as involving accurate mental representations of things out in the world as they “really are in themselves,” but these scientists have redefined cognitive processes in terms of material interactions between the organism and its environment. In these interactions, the organism, in the words of scientists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, “brings forth a world” according to a continual, minute level assessment of its own state, the state of its environment, its needs and the potential for harm or growth implicit in each unfolding moment. Cognition thus includes perception, emotion, and behavior and, for human beings, with our highly complex nervous system, language. From this point of view language is central to how it is that we human beings maintain ourselves as living organisms because it brings forth a world, rather than merely represents it.

This is an important point that bears emphasis. When we use words as though they represent things out there in the world, we tend to treat both those things and words as though they were objects, fixed and static. When we use them as Williams does here, we actually participate in the making of a dynamic, potentially endless fabric of relations whose threads connect and pass through all fixed and static things or identities. And this is to say that an adequate idea of language entails understanding its constitutive force in the creation of a universe of relations much like the universe described by Spinoza in his Ethics, or by contemporary scientists in a number of disciplines for whom, increasingly, the world is best understood as an integrated system of interrelated parts, parts that are themselves a part of further interrelations. The interconnectedness of things and all that this implies, all that is joyful and inspiring and painful and terrifying about it, is what comes to matter most when we understand our use of words in this way.

A student once pointed out that the one word that really does seem just a bit out of place in this poem of very simple words is “glazed.” I think that’s connected to this shift from the object to seeing the object, to my relationship with it. “Glazed” describes a kind of addition to the surface of the red wheelbarrow. It’s where the red wheelbarrow meets the rain and their meeting makes a glaze. But if that’s the case then glazed also describes the moment of my optical encounter with the red wheelbarrow. This glazed surface, which I might imagine for myself as somewhere between completely reflective and completely transparent, is what my eye meets when I look. Glazed then also emphasizes the surface of the wheelbarrow over and above its three dimensional volume. It’s not so much that I can’t imagine or, could not see the whole wheelbarrow. It’s that this word draws my attention to its surface. In this sense, I think of this poem as a way of saying, “Yes!” in response to a question. But the question isn’t “is there a red wheelbarrow?” The question is “Do you see that a red wheelbarrow exists, and do you see that it matters, do you see what depends upon it?” As important as the object, and indispensable to grasping the importance of the object, is grasping my relationship to the object, my recognition of my participation in the existence of the object. Indeed, I’d go one step further and assert that at this particular moment in the reading the very categories of subject and object no longer have any meaningful purchase on the experience.

But "glazed" takes me beyond the optical encounter with the surface. The translucent glistening of the surface makes the surface not only visible but also palpable. When the poem makes me slow down, I feel as if my eyes have touched. Through "glazed," it is as if I can almost feel the cool, slippery surface, and seeing feels like touching. “Glaze” is the artificial, the fictional, in that sense of fiction that refers to our powers to bring forth and to make something new out of the web of life in which we are a strand. Glaze is the made thing that exists and by so being stands for the connectedness of things, of wheelbarrow and rain and eyesight and touch. In that sense, glaze stands for the connecting that we do when we read to live.

It becomes, then, a matter of texture. That's where the chickens come in. I just love those white chickens that seem to punctuate the poem. I think it is because "white," besides being just a color with its optical contrast and harmony with red, becomes a texture – feathery – in contrast and harmony with the surface of the wheelbarrow. I start to wonder if the feathers of the chicken are also wet and if so how? Surely it is differently than the way the wheelbarrow is. So I am drawn in to play along these varied surfaces and I think this is so simple and just so nice. And like all play, it is also not so simple and still so nice.

I am lost at play,. For once I am happily relieved of the usual categories of subject and object, self and other, and so forth. Instead of a seeing eye, a red wheelbarrow, glazed with rain water, beside some white chickens, there is a single undulating, dynamic fabric of being woven from the relations among these things. These things, after all, only appear as things apart from me when I step out of the playing and separate them out from one another as things with names.

We may experience the poem as a prayer or incantation. We may experience the poem as magical in the way that it uses the vehicle of verse poetry to draw intense focus upon a single instant of the ordinary seeing of an ordinary object upon which in the moment of reading, so much does depend. So it’s a poem made of magic words. Like all incantations these sixteen magic words make themselves true by being said, they bring into being the conditions in the world that they describe. But we can experience all words as magic words, at least in the sense that even when they are pretending just to describe a bit of the world they are doing something to the world.

To speak more precisely, I’m arguing that we might gain something valuable in our relationship to words if we accept that all words express relations in which we do something to the world and at the same time, have something done to us. Part of the magic is in the increase in our capacity to act that comes with acting in accordance with an idea of the potency of language. In other words, the magic is in transforming a passive, passionate appreciation into an active understanding. Certainly, nothing could more excite a person like me who has devoted most of his life to words than to hear that they are all magic, and magically powerful.

Now Williams’ words scurry around the page like elementary schoolchildren bustling to get in line during a performance. They arrange themselves in an orderly single horizontal line, like the one I set out a few pages back, stretching across the page, each one exciting on its own, but also now, with their unique mysterious powers fully restored, the overall magic intensifies. Because now that horizontal line of words isn’t an ordinary proposition claiming to represent truly a piece of the world. Now their movement, which is nothing more than an effect of the encounter called reading, brings forth not only the force of an ordinary object like a red wheelbarrow glazed with rain water beside the white chickens, and the force of the act of seeing, but also the force of what I might dismiss as ordinary language and the force of my relationship to the universe moving inside and outside of me. The reading makes the ordinary extraordinary and shows me how it is done so that I can do it too, in reading the poem but also on my own, when I have set his book and his words down and picked up a pen to write my own.

In so doing the reading also shifts us back from extraordinary to ordinary. The poetic function, in most cultures an extraordinary function of seeing and making, ceases to be solely the property of the poet as an exceptional genius. What else might I have expected from an extraordinary poet who never stopped being an ordinary doctor, writing poems on his prescription pad between visits? It is extraordinary to bring the extraordinary back to the ordinary. By the end of the whole operation, even the categories “ordinary” and “extraordinary” (like those of “subject” and “object” previously) just don’t seem to matter much anymore: there is just the breathtaking composition of forces at play, of impersonal powers exercised, capacities flexed.

Such a reading activates the capacities of the poet and communicates them to the reader, like a gift. In that sense the reading makes me feel gifted. And so I am, in fact, to the degree that I am aware of the gifts of a red wheelbarrow and of the facts that I can see it and bring it forth in language. To the degree, in other words, that I form an idea of this encounter. That is the feeling of exhilaration I experienced when I first encountered this poem, The term poetry comes to us from the Greek word poiesis, which means “making” in a broad sense of the term. Reading Williams’ poem had made me able to say I am a poet in the sense that in reading – though I do not literally compose a poem – I activate my own creative powers in language. I make myself: autopoiesis.

I want to finish my story about Eva by sharing with you a passage from a book she chose, with certain words she underlined (which I will italicize) and the few lines she wrote to explain why she’d underlined those words. We found a passage in Madeleine L’Engle’s A Wrinkle in Time. The book centers on the adventures of a young, headstrong girl named Meg whose scientifically gifted little brother has mysteriously disappeared. In a climactic scene in the novel, Meg encounters her brother Charles, apparently possessed by this emotionless brain called IT. When we get to the scene that Eva chose, Meg is at the end of her rope, unable to think of a way to rescue her beloved brother:

She could stand there and she could love Charles Wallace.
Her own Charles Wallace, the real Charles Wallace, the child for whom she had come back to Camazotz, to IT, the baby who was so much more than she was, and who was yet so utterly vulnerable.
She could love Charles Wallace.
Charles. Charles, I love you. My baby brother who always takes care of me. Come back to me, Charles Wallace, come away from IT, come back, come home. I love you, Charles. Oh, Charles Wallace, I love you.
Tears were streaming down her cheeks, but she was unaware of them.
Now she was even able to look at him, at this animated thing that was not her own Charles Wallace at all. She was able to look and love.
I love you. Charles Wallace, you are my darling and my dear and the light of my life and the treasure of my heart. I love you. I love you. I love you.
Slowly his mouth closed. Slowly his eyes stopped their twirling. The tic in his forehead ceased its revolting twitch. Slowly he advanced toward her.
“I love you!” She cried. “I love you, Charles! I love you!”
Then suddenly he was running, pelting, he was in her arms, he was shrieking with sobs. “Meg! Meg! Meg!”
I love you, Charles!” she cried again, her sobs almost as loud as his, her tears mingling with his. “I love you! I love you! I love you!”

Eva and I sat at the kitchen table. And I ask her,
“What words jump out at you, Ev?”
Almost without hesitation she circles the phrase “Slowly his mouth closed. Slowly his eyes stopped their twirling. The tic in his forehead ceased its revolting twitch.” So then I ask her,
“Why do these words jump out at you, do you think?” Eva stumbles a bit,
“I don’t know...they just do...it’s like...’slowly his mouth closed’...” and then Eva falls silent but she slowly closes her mouth. And then she stands up and begins to twirl her body around.

Here’s what she wrote for her homework: “I like the way the author said ‘twirling’ and ‘slowly his mouth closed’ because it makes me so excited that I want to do the movements instead of just thinking ‘I’m reading this, wow whoopee, what the heck!’” What better demonstration could we have to show that even descriptive words do something to the world? When she had finished her homework Eva danced around the room repeating the words and then, still chanting the magic words, she skipped off to her bedroom to reread the book. She’d been transformed by the magic. She was spellbound. In that moment, the author and Eva and I had worked together to bring words to life, to give words dimension and depth and feeling and flesh. May she always be so enchanted and may she always – may we all always -- be so graceful in communicating her enchantments, be they literary or otherwise.

Of course, in that moment, Eva wasn’t thinking all the things that I’ve just written above. She was, rather, we were, simply doing them. And doing them as she did can be joy enough for any of us. But we can take the extra step, the risk, of understanding the joy of that practice and thereby make it an enduring source of active joys.

I’m reminded of how the physicist Richard Feynman responded to an artist friend who teased Feynman that his scientific understanding of the world left him unable to appreciate the beauty of a flower. Feynman acknowledged that he might not be as aesthetically refined as his friend, but still insisted that he could see the beauty his friend saw. What’s more, he went on, “I can see much more about the flower than he sees. I can imagine the cells in there, the complicated actions inside which also have a beauty. I mean it’s not just beauty at this dimension of one centimeter, there is also beauty at a smaller dimension, the inner structure.” Feynman employs his imagination and his scientific powers to understand, deepen, and enrich his enjoyment of the beauty of the flower.

To give an idea of the endless communicative potency of such readings, I would like to add a brief coda. When Claire discussed with me her suggestions for this reading, she recalled her own childhood love of L’Engle’s work. She explained that she used to read L’Engle’s journals as well, in which the author discussed the importance of love, particularly the Christian notion of agape, to her fiction. Claire pointed out that in this particular scene, which is tense with the apparent hopelessness of Charles’ prodigious scientific gifts being governed forevermore by the affectless, lifeless IT, Meg breaks down. Meg has always considered herself quite ordinary and relatively powerless. In this scene, she confronts quite dramatically the limits of her power as a subject, that is, as an agent who might consider herself the author and executor of a calculated plan to manipulate the object world around her. All plans have fallen apart. Meg herself has fallen apart.
But, as Claire pointed out to me, what rushes in when Meg falls apart is the potency of affect, unleashed from the bounds of a world of subjects and objects. Crucially, Meg understands this. She forms an idea of the affects she is experiencing and of their true power. And it is at that moment that the love pouring forth through and beyond the bare outlines of “Meg” absolutely overwhelms even the awesome, prodigious powers of IT,which are still bound and limited by the inadequate idea of possession (and, by extension, of the categories of subject and object that possession still implies). Spinoza could ask for no better example. And so the reading, and the joy, goes on.

My reading of Williams’ poem, emerging within the context of my academic experience and the challenge of helping someone else love not only reading but thinking about reading, has introduced some of the basic concerns of this book: the nature of affect, in particular of joy and love, and its relation to thought, in particular to reason, in the process of joyfully living a series of encounters, of which reading is one, while embedded in a world of relations that we do not fully control nor understand. This book is an attempt to describe and practice a way of reading that shares Spinoza’s vision of the world and partakes of the ethic of joy, which that vision led him to advocate. Part of what makes Spinoza’s Ethics so moving and inspiring is his acute sensitivity to the fragility and uncertainty of our existence in the universe, taken together with his generous, painstaking attempt to communicate a life that accepts that uncertainty and builds from it a capacity to act and to experience joy. Reading to Live sees reading as an opportunity to experiment with and become aware of the nature of all kinds of encounters, including the most mundane, in all their material, affective and intellectual richness. Then, through such experiments, to nourish those encounters that augment joy; that is, those that enhance our ethical power of acting.

Read more...

Reading One: Enjoying (on William Carlos Williams’ “The Red Wheelbarrow”) [Section 1 of 2]

Monday, May 10, 2010

(Continued from here.)

I once had a problem with my daughter Eva. She was almost eleven years old and loved to read. That wasn’t the problem. The problem was that for homework Eva’s teacher wanted her to write in a journal about what she read. It’s not that the teacher wanted Eva to write anything sophisticated, just to talk about what she loved in this or that passage of a book of her choosing. She didn’t have to write a lot, a page or two a week would do. Fifteen minutes a day. But each day when I reminded her, she made this face, scrunched up her eyes and nose, and said, “I’m busy. I’ll do it later.” And then the night before it was due, simply: “I’m not doing it.” Eva was attending a so-called “open school” where one of the central beliefs is that a child ought to participate actively in her learning, select “home” activities that are fun and engaging. I reminded her of this:

“But Eva you picked this assignment together with your teacher. I mean, you chose this. And besides, you love to read.”
“Yeah,” her voice rose, “I love to read, Dad, read, not write about it.”
“But maybe it would be good to discover what you love about it, no?”
“That’s not how I read,” she countered, “I just read it, finish it and I’m done.”
“But,” I offered, “don’t you want to be able to talk with others about what you’ve read, to tell your friends about books you’ve liked, just to share the good feeling, and maybe even to get them interested enough to want to read it too?”
“I just wanna say that ‘this book is great, you should read it.” And with that, she stalked off into her room.

Of course, getting a child to do something they don’t want to do is not an unusual situation. At this very moment, parents all over the world are facing something similar and solving it, or not, according to their own resources, values, and the pressures of the moment. I might naturally have turned for advice to more experienced parents, or to the innumerable parenting manuals available today, or, even to works specializing on child development, psychology or education. But I didn’t consult any of these resources. Instead, I responded with my own resources: a combination of love for my child, my own experiences as a reader, and my ideas about reading drawn from years working as a literature professor.

That work as a professor included an experience that in some ways resembled Eva’s struggles. I was part of an interviewing team searching to hire a faculty member in Latino studies. The person we were interviewing was a rising star in the field and had finished a book manuscript on some writers she was characterizing as diasporic Puerto Ricans. Her very valid point was that if one saw them this way instead of as just Americans one would see something previously unseen in their writing. Among the authors she discussed was William Carlos Williams.

Now to be truthful I didn’t know a whole lot about her field, or about the other writers she worked on and I don’t in fact know very much about Williams. I’ve read a biography and some of his books, but I’ve never carried out a scholarly investigation of Williams’ writing. That’s probably why when I heard the name I got excited. One of my favorite poems of all time is Williams’ “The Red Wheelbarrow” and I was curious to know what she thought of it as an “expert.” I expected that she’d unfold for me some new intensely joyful corner of this poem. So after the other committee members, specialists in her field, talked with her about theory and culture and the canon of American studies, it was my turn.

I said, “This isn’t really an interview question. I just really love “The Red Wheelbarrow” and wonder what you have to say about it.”
She paused and replied, “I haven’t thought about it.”
I persisted, “Do you like it?”
She was enthusiastic: “Oh yes, of course! I love that poem!” And then, after a pause and with less enthusiasm, she concluded, “it just doesn’t fit with the rest of the stuff in the Williams chapter.”

I was disappointed, and though I kept it to myself, I felt as though she had failed or worse, actively committed some transgression. If she loved a text but couldn’t find room for it within her theoretical paradigm, there must be something wrong with her theoretical paradigm and something wrong with her, too, that she would sacrifice a beloved poem for the sake of methodological neatness (or worse, academic fashion). But as time passed, I realized she was not the problem. Nor do I think I was the problem.

I simply wanted to have a certain kind of conversation about a poem, but that conversation couldn’t really get off the ground within the circumstances in which I was trying to have it. By that I mean not only the setting of an academic job interview, but the conventions of academic training and of professional reward. The experience became an index pointing me back to my own feeling of the increasing intolerability of what had come to feel like a mutually exclusive set of imperatives. One must either read for fun or read for professional success; read for joy or read for work, read for love or read to think, in short, the very same set of oppositions that seemed to be governing my daughter’s impasse in her homework.

John Dewey (1859-1952)
Around the same time, I ran across a passage from John Dewey’s book, Art as Experience. I wasn’t looking for any solutions in Dewey, but rather just allowing myself to be led by my fascination with his clear and concrete way of talking about art. I emphasize that because it often happens with reading to live that encountering texts without pre- calculation often leads to surprisingly relevant insights. Dewey was an American philosopher, an heir to the so-called Pragmatist tradition expounded by William James earlier in the century. I had loved James’ style of writing and his informality, but had turned to Dewey because, in part, he wrote directly about art.

The particular passage that struck me was part of Dewey’s discussion of the ways in which art and our experience of it challenges certain assumptions that philosophers might make when looking at the world. In this case, Dewey was looking at theories of art as illusion, dream, escape, or play. Dewey objected to these theories not because art cannot be all of these things, but rather because art is so much more than all of these things. In fact, art, according to Dewey is the experience of the boundary dissolving between these things and their supposedly mutually exclusive opposites of reality, waking life, imprisonment, or work. Seeing it this way, in turn, led Dewey to question the much more fundamental philosophical dichotomy between subject and object, or self and world.

When we view art as an “escape” or a “release” from reality, Dewey believed, we implicitly suppose “freedom can be found only when personal activity is liberated from control by objective factors.” We implicitly take what Dewey called “experience” – the ceaseless exchange of matter and energy of a live creature growing in and with its surroundings – and we first freeze it in time and then split it into two opposed and mutually exclusive halves. On one side is the live creature, which we call a “subject” or “self,” together with its desires. On the other side, the surroundings, including other subjects, which we call “objects” or “others,” together with the limitations we perceive these surroundings impose on us. Therefore in viewing art as an escape from reality we implicitly pretend to isolate our “self” from everything that we perceive as “outside” of and oppressive to it. “Play” then becomes the name for what we can do when we suppose ourselves to be free of objective limitations. “Work,” by contrast, becomes the name for what we do the rest of the time, when we numbly or sullenly submit to those limitations – or attempt to manipulate them from a utilitarian distance -- and thereby protect our “self” through a detached intellectual posture. All the while, we forget that we made these distinctions and opposed them to each other.

But for Dewey, “the very existence of a work of art is evidence that there is no such opposition between the spontaneity of the self and objective order and law.” True, Dewey admitted, “the contrast between free and externally enforced activity is an empirical fact.” However, he added, “it is largely produced by social conditions and it is something to be eliminated as far as possible.” It is a sad mistake to see this social and historical condition as natural and immutable. And perhaps even sadder to see it and just let it be. After all, as Dewey points out, “children are not conscious of any opposition between play and work.”

Of course, here I remember thinking “Well he doesn’t know my kid.” But I see that it wasn’t until the structure of school, the importance of grades, and the assigning of homework entered her life that Eva started to experience the difference between learning as play and learning as work. She was, after all, nearly eleven and already much exposed to, this opposition between play and work, and also to my modeling of it. Dewey’s point is that there’s nothing natural or given or unchangeable about this and art can be a way to rub away at this stark opposition. It invites us to participate in and experience as integrated what have become for most of us two mutually exclusive ways of engaging a world of existence that we have divided into two mutually exclusive parts.

I’d like to recast this opposition between play and work into a slightly different vocabulary. The philosopher Neal Grossman devotes a chapter of his commentary on Spinoza’s Ethics to the latter’s theory of desire and emotion.

I want to draw your attention to a few pages in Grossman’s Healing the Mind because of their affinities with the problem at hand. Grossman emphasizes the critical role that the cultivation of the nonjudgmental awareness of affect plays in Spinoza’s Ethics. In emphasizing this role, Grossman pauses to describe what he calls “social schizophrenia” or “the split or incongruity between inner feelings and outer behavior.” His argument is that from early childhood we are trained, subtly and not so subtly, to constrain not only our affects but our awareness of those affects so that we will be able to behave in conformity with social expectations. Moreover, Grossman argues, we have been trained so thoroughly that we take our training for nature, and so have strong unconscious view that “such schizophrenia is necessary and normal and that a person who has not succeeded in separating his ‘personal’ life from his ‘professional’ life is in some sense immature.” Grossman goes on to enumerate the devastating consequences of this dynamic for individuals, for societies, and for the planet as a whole but also movingly insists that since this dynamic is not in fact natural but rather devised by human beings we also have the freedom to devise alternatives.

All of this dovetails nicely with Dewey’s ideas on work and play and its associated oppositions. What is particularly striking about this part of Grossman’s argument is that he brings the chickens home to the academic roost. Within the academy, Grossman points out, the phenomenon of social schizophrenia manifests itself as an opposition between reason and analysis on the one hand and affect and appreciation on the other. “The triviality,” Grossman writes,
of most academic research lies in just this point: the kind of analysis given by people who are not personally connected with what they are analyzing – and academics are especially trained to be this way – is necessarily shallow and will at best belong to . . . to the ‘true but useless’ category. . . . Analysis that is separated from inner life is precisely the schizophrenic split that is the root cause of humanity’s collective death wish.
Grossman’s reflections on social schizophrenia and its academic manifestation help to clarify the problems Eva and I had experienced and that Dewey’s reflections on work and play elaborated philosophically. How could I write affirmatively of the joy of loving and thinking that engaging books roused in me without stalling my career? How could I work within the academy in such a way as to make a space for that sort of writing, for myself and others with less institutional power, and still leave other colleagues and students free to do their work the way they saw fit? Why did I have to love privately and think publicly? How in the world did we get to the point where it seemed possible to really do either of these things – loving and thinking – without the other?

We are ensnared in a series of oppositions arising in our minds and related to their enforcement by social institutions and practices: play and work, self and other, subject and object, desire and obligation, affect and intellect. The naturalized hold these oppositions have on our way of experiencing and thinking about the world is the source of much suffering. The suffering arises not from the oppositions themselves but from the fact that we take them to be reflections of the way the world really is, independently of our views of it. We could, for example, see them as mental tools we have devised to accomplish certain purposes and which we should feel entirely free to set down for the accomplishment of other purposes.

Conversely, the erosion of these oppositions and the loosening of their grasp on our experience and thought play a major role in reading to live and in my understanding of what reading can be. And, by extension, in my understanding of the way that reading can be a practice of cultivating joy and freedom in our lives. The question might be simply how to heal. How do we recover from our compulsive, addictive dependence on these oppositions? How do we dissolve or elude the imaginary barrier on either side of which we conceive these dichotomous terms stand? It is perhaps no accident that Grossman’s argument comes in a commentary on Spinoza, because Spinoza provided what is for me perhaps the most compelling and inspiring methods for responding to this problem. Spinoza offered in his Ethics an encompassing and complex view of God, nature, human nature, and how, in particular, humans can move toward greater freedom.

But at the heart of this broad and profound vision is the following simple advice: 1) your emotions and feelings are signs that you are inevitably engaged in the world, for better and for worse; 2) your emotions and feelings provide you with information about the current state of your engagement, particularly whether you are being nourished or harmed by it; 3) attempting to ignore or repress your emotions and feelings does not make them go away, it only deprives you of important information; 4) observing your emotions and feelings and studying their relationship to the actual state of your engagement with the world is already in itself a nourishing, joyful, empowering act and can, moreover, lead you to begin to reconfigure your engagement with the world so as to maximize your nourishing encounters, and positive emotions and feelings, and minimize you harmful encounters, and negative emotions.

The more we become aware of our emotions and feelings, which means first and foremost becoming aware with our bodies (Spinoza’s term for what our bodies feel, for example pleasure or pain, is “affections,” contemporary neuropyschologists like Antonio Damasio in Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorry and the Feeling Brain call this “emotion”) the more we come to understand the complex network of cause and effect which not only impacts our bodies but also leads us to form ideas (whether adequate or inadequate) about what is going on with our bodies. These ideas are what Spinoza calls “affects” and contemporary neuropsychologists call “feelings.” As we develop this understanding and awareness, we begin to realize that while our affects may be responses to external events, i.e. you might really yell at me and my body might really tense or freeze up and sadness might really arise in my mind, our affects are not caused by those events.

Grasping this subtle distinction subtle distinction that our affects are responses to, but not caused by external events, not only rationally and intellectually, but with our whole being, is the lived practice of Spinoza’s Ethics. In so becoming aware of our affects and comprehending them, we increase our freedom in the sense that we increase our ability to behave according to choices grounded in this awareness and comprehension rather than in blind enslavement to our attachment to passing pleasures or aversion to passing pains. We can come to understand these pleasures and pains not as problems to be solved but as information about our dynamic relation with some part of the world. We find that we need not, must not, repress our affects, especially painful affects, in order to free ourselves of their roller-coaster effects. We can learn to experience, be aware of, and understand our affects and use the information they provide to make more joyful choices.

Specifically, for Spinoza, we apply reason to the information they provide to form what he calls “adequate ideas.” The term “adequate” here, for Spinoza, means something like “accurate,” but with an important specification. An “adequate” idea of some thing or event for Spinoza is accurate when it allows us to grasp, at least partially, the chain of cause and effect, which led the appearance of that thing or event. Or, in Spinoza specialist Steven Nadler’s paraphrase:
“an adequate idea of x is an idea that makes possible a full explanation of x. It shows how x is related to its total causal and logical grounds and reveals the absolute necessity of x and everything about x. Inadequate ideas, by contrast, are ‘mutilated and confused.’ . . . Inadequacy is thus a matter of ignorance or a ‘privation of knowledge.’ . . . One knows something about the thing, but not enough to be able to state truly why it is such.”

A similar insight concerning the importance of understanding affect lies at the heart of Buddhist thought and practice. The Buddhist psychotherapist Mark Epstein reaches a comparable point when he writes “the emotions [Spinoza’s affects, Damasio’s feelings] that we take to be so real and are so worried about do not exist in the way we imagine them. They do exist, but we can know them in a way that is different from either expressing or repressing them.” This, according to Epstein, is the shared aim of Buddhist meditation and psychotherapy. Stephen Batchelor likewise observes, for example, of the way in which awareness of the experience of hatred can defuse it: “To stop and pay attention to what is happening in the moment is one way of snapping out of such fixations. It is also a reasonable definition of meditation.”

Stopping and paying attention to what is happening is also a reasonable way of summing up what Spinoza advises we do with our affects in his Ethics. Spinoza’s formal definition of “affects” as “affections [his term for what our bodies feel, recall] of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time ideas of these affections.” For Spinoza an “affection of the body” can be understood as an event that impacts that body. It may be as simple as drinking a glass of water or having a gust of wind blow against your face or as complex as receiving treatment for cancer. With that in mind, Spinoza appears to be saying that an affect is that change in our body’s power to act plus an idea of what it is that has changed. That much just sounds like a slightly more technical-sounding version of what I’ve already described. But what does he mean by “power to act” and, for that matter, by “body” and “idea”?

The phrase “power to act” here is a particularly loaded, complex, and exciting one in Spinoza. For just as the definition of affect depends upon it, so it in turn depends upon Spinoza’s understanding of the relation of particular, finite, or singular things (such Eva or myself) to what he calls, interchangeably, “Substance,” “God” or “Nature.” The power to act is like a lynch-pin, or hinge between Spinoza’s vision of how the universe hangs together and his vision of how our feelings work to nourish or harm our ability to live well in that universe.

For Spinoza, things like you, me, and the mulberry tree out the window are, in the words of Nadler, “a partial and limited expression of one and the same infinite power of God/Nature/substance, manifesting itself in the case of minds through the attribute of Thought and in the case of bodies through the attribute of Extension.” Nadler continues: “Every particular mind, then, is a finite expression of God or Nature’s infinite power through thinking; likewise, every particular body is a finite expression of God or nature’s infinite power in matter and motion. This finite quantum of that infinite power that constitutes each thing is what Spinoza calls conatus, a Latin word that can be variously translated as striving, tendency, or endeavor.” According to Antonio Damasio, we may translate conatus into contemporary terms as “the aggregate of dispositions laid down in brain circuitry that, once engaged by internal or environmental conditions, seeks both survival and well-being.”

The conatus then might be seen as a specific expression of our “power of acting” (or as Spinoza also refers to it “force of existing”). What an exciting concept! It tells us that we all carry within us a power to act that is a portion of Nature’s, or God’s if you prefer, much larger, in fact infinite– power to act.
It’s impossible for me to resist the temptation to say straight away that keeping a human being connected to his or her power to act is of the utmost ethical importance, and conversely, that I can think of no greater tragedy than to come between a human being and his or her power to act. But it’s really even better than this because the conatus constitutes the essence of each particular finite thing: “The striving [conatus] by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing.” That is, the particular conatus that we have is what makes each of us,and every other singular thing, what it uniquely is and allows us to distinguish it from other things. In other words, our nature is Nature’s and that is infinite.

Our conatus, or power or striving to persevere in our being, “while always ‘on’ and steady,” as Nadler points out, “does not remain unmodified throughout a person’s lifetime, but is constantly subject to change. In particular, the power can enjoy an increase or strengthening or can suffer a decrease of diminution.” What Spinoza calls an “improvement” or “deterioration” in the condition of a particular thing includes the strength or weakness of conatus, this capacity of each thing to preserve itself and resist or elude those outside forces that would tend to destroy it.

And this is where our affects come in. An affect is neither the cause of such a change, nor the new state of that capacity. Affect refers to the transition to the new state of conatus, as well as to the idea (or, we might say mental experience) of that transition. For example, Joy, according to Spinoza is “a man’s passage from a lesser to a greater perfection.” In other words, joy arises when our ability to act in accordance with our essential nature has been increased.

What is completely counterintuitive and even shocking in Spinoza is his definition of strength or power as the capacity of “being affected in a great many ways or capable of affecting external bodies in a great many ways.” We are in our culture used to defining strength as the ability to resist or to manipulate the outside world. But Spinoza here complicates this conventional definition. He makes strength or power into a relational term: a term of measure whose quantity depends entirely on the extent and force of the affective relations in play. The greater our capacity for affect and for affecting the greater the strength or power involved. It means, to put it very directly, that someone sobbing can be showing great strength.

Spinoza divides affects into two types: passions and actions. The most important difference between a passion and an action stems from the way we think about the cause of the affect in question. An affect is a “passion” when we view the cause as external to us. It is an “action” when we view the cause as lying within us, whether or not we “take action” in our everyday sense of the term. For Spinoza, action is freedom. So how do we change our thinking so as to transform passions into action?

We change our thinking by finding what we share with what we are passionate about. This process of finding what Spinoza called “common notions” is what I call reading to live. It is not just passionately enjoying a book as the external cause of a passively activated pleasure (an affect of passion in Spinoza’s terms). It means recognizing myself in the book and in the reading of it as being fundamentally powerful because I am moved and because the book, its author, and the world beyond are all part of, and moved by, the same power that moves me. To understand this is what Spinoza called “forming a clear and distinct idea” of our affect. As he said, “a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it. . . . The more an affect is known to us, then, the more it is in our power, and the less the mind is acted on by it.”

So it started to seem to me that the issue with Eva, and with me, is that we identified ourselves with our passions. As Batchelor observes of a passion, “By identifying with it (‘I really am pissed off!’), we fuel it.” Especially when the passion is positive we can become attached to it and fuel it further by clinging to our identification with it. Eva and I attributed an external cause to our pleasure, which prevented us from acting fully, in Spinoza’s sense of the word “acting,” and thus, from fully enjoying reading. Following Spinoza’s argument, understanding our pleasure and that its cause lies within us might enhance our enjoyment. Eva was attached to the reliable pleasure that it appeared to her came from passively reading a good book. She was reluctant to risk losing this passion in the attempt to extend the pleasure of reading that book beyond the immediate experience of reading and thereby to transmute her passion into action, her pleasure into joy arising from recognizing that she and the book were joined in ways that increased her ability to exercise her power to act

For Spinoza, every action arises as the result of the transformation of a passion, and that transformation always occurs as the result of the willingness to take the risk of extending our awareness beyond the immediate experience of the passion and its dictates. It feels like the risk we are taking is that of losing our love of reading. When Eva postponed doing her homework, when I procrastinated writing an article or veered between doing whatever I felt like doing or sullenly submitted to what I perceived as externally imposed demands, it was out of the fear that our actions would tarnish the attractiveness of the object of our passions, which we incorrectly believed was the cause of our joy.

I live best when I live joyfully and I live most joyfully when I seek to understand that web of cause and effects that is my existence embedded in a universe, my relations with which I only partly control. When I cultivate awareness of and grasp the productive operations of my own desire, as well as how the lure of my sad passions lead me away from that desire, I am in that instant ”taking action.”
In other words, the act of understanding itself, is active joy for Spinoza. It might not be the euphoric high or rush (“passive joy”) when fate appears to toss an external object across my path that enhances my power to act. But unlike that joy, active joy draws upon my awareness of the impacting event and the ensuing passive joy, and upon my capacity to understand that passive joy, in order to transmute passion into action. I don’t just know that certain things make me feel joy or sadness, but I know, or at least know more about, why and how they do, how they are composed and how I am composed such that they do. And from there, perhaps, I can come to cultivate those relations that increase my power to act and reduce those which decrease it. Which is to say to enhance my freedom and joy. (To be continued)

Read more...

Prelude: A Story of Reading to Live (Section 1 of 3)

Sunday, May 9, 2010

(Continued from here.)

I wasn’t always a professor of literature. I started out as a pretty normal person, a kid growing up in a suburban neighborhood in the Midwestern university town of Madison, Wisconsin, the youngest by far of four children born to a Spanish-born couple that had come to Madison via Cali, Colombia and Portland, Oregon. My father was a professor of biochemistry and my mother a housewife. Our family room, where we spent most of our evenings, had built-in bookcases lined with books in different languages and from a range of different disciplines: encyclopedias, novels, works of philosophy, scientific textbooks, biographies and autobiographies.

There was much unhappiness and tension in our household when I was growing up, many arguments in that family room. I did not seriously explore the books on those shelves until college, but already as a child I drew comfort from staring at them in an unfocused way. Perhaps it was the combination of order and disorder in the shelves themselves: the neat parallel lines of the firm wood shelves themselves spiced by the great variety of sizes, colors, textures, and languages of the books. I see myself lying on the thick carpeting in front of the fieldstone fireplace where my dad usually had a good fire going in winter. I lay there and whatever else might be going on, whatever tense silence or explosive argument might be in the air, the very sight of the dark wood of the shelves peppered with books drew me in and away from my worries and comforted me.

From an early age my mother and my siblings read to me and, once I knew how, I was encouraged to read for myself and I took to it with great relish. I was not a very discriminating reader at that time, nor a precocious one. I wasn’t one of those future academics who at an oddly early age were reading Moby Dick; more like Inky: The Seeing Eye Dog. I especially liked sports books, biographies of famous athletes and novels about basketball players. (My other great escape from the tension in the household was listening to Milwaukee Bucks basketball games broadcast on a little red and white, dice-like transistor radio I kept by my pillow). But really, I would read or at least try pretty much anything. I had older siblings who also enjoyed reading and so sometimes they would read to me or lend me the simpler books that they were reading for high school classes or for their own enjoyment.

This lasted until around the time I hit puberty. At that point I discovered girls and competitive team sports. I was too shy to act on my discovery of girls. But I threw myself wholeheartedly into sports, especially basketball and soccer. Yet even in high school, when I devoted most of my energy and attention to sports, I never fully abandoned books and writing. It was, as you might imagine given the way cliques fall out in high schools, a not entirely comfortable combination of interests. I had my sports friends with whom I shared my enjoyment of athletics, while keeping my bookish self under wraps and I had my bookish friends in front of whom I played down my love of sports. Only very, very rarely did I experience the opportunity to share with others the whole range of what brought me joy in my life and feel that they accepted it. Now that I think about it, it was neither the sports nor the books, nor the collision of disparate interests and groups of friends that felt difficult. It was my passion for them, it was the unwieldy feeling of my desire. No doubt most teenagers suffer their desire as unwieldy. Maybe in my case the social divergence of the paths my desires took exacerbated my sense that they were too much.

When I got to college, I maintained my love of sports, but my competitive career had ended. On the other hand, the wider and more diverse intellectual and social world of the university—in my case the University of Wisconsin at Madison (as compared to my small Catholic high school) -- provided ample social rewards for returning and deepening my love of books and writing. In fact, by my second year in college, reading had become the most enjoyable activity in my life and the core of my self-image. So much so, in fact, that I switched into Comparative Literature as a major, just so that I could spend more of my time reading (and because, at that time, the Comp Lit majors seemed cooler and more attractive to me than the Poli Sci majors).

It’s true, with that switch I had to write papers about what I’d read. But that didn’t seem like too high a price to pay. Besides, it offered the compensating pleasure of being told by my professors that I was smart and good at it. Beyond this, I rediscovered a hidden pleasure, forgotten since childhood, in creative writing, mostly poems and some stories. I just loved that I could make something out of words, could make words do things to people like feel happy or sad or think differently about something, or even make them do something they wouldn’t normally do.

Already in this way of describing my love of writing, I can see how blurry the boundary was between what I loved for its own sake and what I loved because of its effect on others. This struggle to feel and to become more comfortable expressing my desire (including the desire – rather than the compulsive need – to help others) remains present in my life. In fact, most of the readings that follow, the literature and the philosophy that have inspired those readings, speak in painful and inspiring ways to that tension between self and world of which mine is just a subspecies.

But in any event, books and creative writing were in fact what I did. In the very cool autobiographical movie I would run in my head at the time, walking the leafy autumn pathways along the lakeshore in Madison, I was becoming a poet. Of course, few poets can make a living just by writing poems. The lore of poetic history is populated with stories of writers starving, working odd jobs, making do in steadfast pursuit of their creativity. I certainly wasn’t brave enough to just strike out on my own as a poet upon graduation, washing dishes or landscaping or whatever it might take or traveling or living abroad teaching English in a foreign land. Meanwhile, as I said, my professors were telling me I was good at the study of literature and should go to graduate school.

So I got myself into a graduate school thinking, naively as it turned out, that I’d take the fellowship that was offered and read more books for a couple of years, move from my Midwestern hometown, away from my family, to Durham, North Carolina (even this choice was partly made because of my love of the college basketball teams – Duke, North Carolina, North Carolina State -- on what is called “Tobacco Road”) and write more poems. When the fellowship was up, I figured, I’d drop out. I imagined that by that time I’d be brave enough to support myself with some kind of job that would give me time to read as well as give me what I idealized as the kind of “real life experience” that I could mill into poems and stories of my own.

But if, or when, the time came, I didn’t recognize it and, in any event, I sure didn’t drop out. I enrolled in Duke University’s Graduate Program in Literature in the fall of 1987. At that time Duke was a very high-powered place in academic literary studies. The very first week I was there, a conference was being held called “Theories of Narrative and Narratives of Theory,” featuring speakers like Terry Eagleton, Gayatri Spivak, Fredric Jameson (the head of my new program), Jonathan Culler, Henry Louis Gates Jr., and Stanley Fish – most of the biggest names in the world of literary studies.

During orientation week, a fellow first-year student asked me if I was a Marxist. I replied “what’s that?” I really didn’t know, or maybe I was really nervous and couldn’t come up with an answer. It certainly seems to me now a shocking expression of ignorance– what college graduate doesn’t know what Marxism is?! But then something odd and, eventually, telling, happened. Rather than laugh at me or mock my ignorance, he looked at me with a kind of self-castigating admiration and said, “Oh, yeah, of course, I see what you mean.” I had no idea what had just happened in that exchange and was to shy to press for clarification. But after a few weeks of classes, I was able to understand that he had invoked a category of identity – “Marxist” – as though its meaning were self evident and then asked me whether the category applied to me or not. By asking him “what’s that?” I had inadvertently questioned the definition of the category that he was taking for granted. I had unwittingly stumbled into critical thinking. But I didn’t know I was doing that, I thought I was just asking a simple question.

It turns out it was nearly impossible to ask a simple question at Duke and have it received as such; just as it was nearly impossible to express a simple, like or dislike for some piece of literature without an elaborate intellectual rationalization to justify it. On the contrary, it felt to me as though the very idea of taking joy in reading – if it merited any attention at all -- was to be analyzed and theorized until the feeling shriveled up and shrank away in shame into some dark corner. I learned to say that something was “really interesting” when I meant I really liked it or really didn’t like it. And the joy I felt when I read– if I accidentally confessed it –was to be diagnosed as a symptom of my addiction to the dangerously deceptive palliative of aesthetic enjoyment and interpreted and treated accordingly. In place of the joy of reading, I developed the more muted pleasure of producing acute ideological critiques of works of literature. I learned to show how books simultaneously protested the oppressive social conditions in which they were produced and unwittingly betrayed their complicity with them.. Openly enjoying the surface of the text gave way to suspiciously interrogating it: “C’mon, we know you’re holding back buddy, cough it up, talk! We have ways of making you cooperate.”

Of course, that’s an overly dramatic, one-sided, not-very-nice and by itself not very helpful way of telling the story. It’s not that the people in my program were doing anything wrong or that it wasn’t satisfying in its own way or that there isn’t value in that sort of reading of texts. On the contrary, I think it’s perfectly reasonable, even desirable, that intellectuals tend to the connections between their particular interests and their society. I learned then and still today believe that there’s much more enjoyment to be found in reading when we go beyond just “loving” or “hating” a book and take the time to scrutinize with care the hidden assumptions that attend a text and shape our experience of it.

It might be truer and more helpful to cast my experience as a parable of a young man interacting with an institution. In other words, as a kind of coming of age story, just as Philip Pullman’s His Dark Materials or Roberto Arlt’s Mad Toy, which I will discuss in later chapters are coming of age stories; just as, in fact, Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect could be read as a kind of coming of age story. As a young man, perhaps like others, I had a fragile sense of my own desires and as an institution, Duke’s Graduate Program in Literature, like other institutions, had a rather strong sense of its desires, or perhaps “purposes” would be a more accurate word.

Even or especially beyond my academic, intellectual, and professional life, I experienced this difference in strength of purpose as an unbearable tension between a compulsion to do whatever I felt like doing and a compulsion to fulfill what I understand to be the purposes or expectations of someone or thing outside myself whose approval I craved. In general, I responded to this tension by veering spastically between the heartless indulgence of pleasures and the equally heartless fulfillment of obligations. In either case, though, the point I want to stress is that I was numb and unaware of the role that my own affirmative, creative desires, whether with respect to myself or others, played in motivating my actions. It seems to me now that an awareness of desire can be sufficient to guide me in acting to fulfill my own needs and to contribute in a reasonable way to fulfilling the needs of others. But at that time, I had no practice in identifying desire and so I swerved back and forth between internally and externally directed compulsions, without ever wondering about, let alone identifying, what I really wanted or how I wanted to be.

Looking at it that way, when I arrived at Duke, I veered in the direction of fulfilling the expectations of others. This may not have been a bad thing in and of itself. Perhaps it is just a description of one kind of education: one exercises one’s sense of one’s own desires by testing them against the stronger or more solidly fixed desires of a teacher or institution (think of the pupil in “The Karate Kid” impatiently waxing the implacable old master’s car). And it could be that, at least for me, veering in the direction of fulfilling intellectual obligations was a necessary corrective to a native fear and mistrust of the intellect.

Growing up with a stern, intellectual father and a warm, emotional mother, I opposed intellect to emotion and associated intellect with a repressive, authoritarian sternness. Perhaps veering toward meeting and exceeding intellectual requirements was a part of trying to come to terms with my intellectual capacity, to see if I could deploy those faculties without becoming violent, or repressive. I am certain that I became addicted to the approval I received for meeting outside expectations. It was addictive because at one stroke it both entailed losing touch with any desires I might have that ran contrary to those expectations and compensated for that loss.

In any event, regardless of the possibly dys-functional or semi-functional dynamics that led me to and through graduate school, I did gain tools, abilities, and even habits of mind that continue to serve me well, even as the uses to which I put them and the interests I seek to serve with them have shifted. Back then, the compensation for becoming an adept at the intellectual and institutional game of academic literary studies was that I finished my doctorate four years later, in 1991. I was able to land an excellent tenure-track job, first at UCLA and then, in the Fall of 1992, at the University of Michigan. At that time, I still loved to read. But writing about what I read had become a chore to be carried out with mechanical efficiency, occasionally with some intellectual flair detached from the beauty of the book, but never, ever with joy. I read, often literally with a pen and paper in hand, mostly with the aim of writing some article or conference paper the appearance of which on my curriculum vitae would garner me more praise and thus help keep the demons of self-doubt at bay for another round.

Despite the absence of joy, and probably because of the security, I didn’t really pause to question this arrangement. My academic career had gotten off to a very promising start with a book already published by a hot university press to mostly favorable reviews, and with lots of requests to give talks and write articles and with the promised land of tenure just around the corner. What’s more, I’d received two prestigious external fellowships that, taken together, afforded me a year off to write a second book, substantial portions of which I’d already completed, and which was a variation on the formula that had gotten me success in my first book. So there I was: in May 1995, not yet thirty years old, turning in a very promising body of scholarship to be evaluated for tenure and looking forward to sixteen months of time to write another book, uninterrupted by teaching or administrative obligations of any kind.

And that’s when the first crisis erupted, not from outside, but from within me. Why exactly that happened in that moment and in that way will probably forever be too complex for me to fully understand, let alone explain. But the way I remember it is that I finished watching a movie (I still remember it was Boys on the Side) and it made me cry. That a movie would move me to tears was neither unprecedented nor remarkable. But what happened next was both. I walked from the living room sofa to the dining table, where I had neatly piled a stack of manila folders containing copies of all the publications and works in progress that I had recently submitted to the chair of my tenure committee. I looked at that stack, the material embodiment of eight years of work and life, counting graduate school, and thought to myself: “none of this has ever moved me to tears, not what I have read and not what I have written.” I recently watched Boys on the Side for the first time since that night and found myself relatively unaffected by it, bringing home the point that I hadn’t cried that day because of the movie. I think I was crying, mourning really, for the lost desiring, the lost feeling inside me.

If my life really were a movie, what would probably follow that instant would be a montage in which, spurred by this epiphany, I transformed my life – late spring would give way to summer, summer to fall and then to the long gray Michigan winter, and then, as bright green leaves began to bud on the trees of Ann Arbor, as crocuses and snowdrops and tulips shot forth from the still cold ground, we’d see a new me: physically, emotionally, spiritually and intellectually fulfilled in my work and in my life. But my life is not a movie and that’s not what happened.

What happened instead during those sixteen months from May 1995 to September 1996 is: 1) I got tenure 2) my wife of six years and I separated and reconciled twice and then split-up for good (we had two children, a girl and a boy, 5 and 4 years old at the time); 3) I stopped working on my second book and started reading whatever I felt like reading – novels from outside my field that I’d long wondered about, works of philosophy that I’d long felt like a fraud for referencing as though I’d read them when I’d only read about them, biographies of and articles about sports figures, especially Dennis Rodman; and 4) near the end of my leave, I started preparing to return to my teaching and administrative responsibilities. I struggled to prepare a course my department had asked me to teach for the Fall of 1996, “Comparative Literature 240: Introduction to Comparative Literature.” The course was a requirement for majors but also designed to draw in non-majors looking to satisfy their humanities requirements and thus boost our enrollments.

I struggled to prepare the course because I felt once again the familiar tension between my desire and external expectations. After what I’d felt and experienced throughout the preceding year, how in the world could I stand before a group of students and provide an introduction to my discipline that would simultaneously entertain the non-majors, not disillusion the majors, and boost the enrollments and visibility of Comparative Literature at the university? What could I tell them? That Comparative Literature was a discipline where books and the love of them go to die? Or that I had no idea what really distinguished Comparative Literature as an area of study and that, even if I did, I didn’t really believe in the value of such distinctions, at least not when weighed against their cost in the form of hyper-specialization and the detachment of advanced scholarship from desire, feeling, and the mess of daily life outside the academy?

Enter Spinoza and the words I quoted in my Introduction. When I read them, I’m somewhat embarrassed to confess, the first image that came to my mind was of the sort of encounter I’d already had many times with colleagues at work or at academic conferences in which someone asked you or you asked someone “what are you working on?” The answer was always something very specialized, often couched in a technical vocabulary: “Oh, you know, I’m working on the intersection of Spivak and Bhabha’s theories of postcoloniality and 19th century Latin American political writing.” I imagined Spinoza responding, “Well, you know, I’m working on finding out whether there’s something which, once found and acquired, will continuously give me the greatest joy, to eternity.”

Put into a contemporary academic context, Spinoza’s answer seems naive if not ridiculous. It is at once lofty and non-specialized and directly aimed at daily life. I certainly didn’t have the chutzpah to say so, but secretly, it’s what I decided I did want to devote my work and life to. And, in this wider context that I’m entering now with this book, I don’t think it seems pretentious or ridiculous at all. Who wouldn’t want to find more joy in their life, let alone a continuously flowing fountain of joy? The question I set to myself at that moment and that, in one way or another, via a very tortuous and erratic path, I have been courting since that time is: what role can reading play in Spinoza’s search for a stable source of joy? More succinctly how can we read to live?

Spinoza had already helped me in another way, indirectly. I found my way to Spinoza by reading a book about Spinoza by the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. On pages 22 and 23 of his book Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Deleuze paraphrases Spinoza:

That individual will be called good (or free, or rational, or strong) who strives, insofar as he is capable, to organize his encounters, to join with whatever agrees with his nature, to combine his relation with relations that are compatible with his, and thereby to increase his power. For goodness is a matter of dynamism, power, and the composition of powers. That individual will be called bad, or servile, or weak, or foolish, who lives haphazardly, who is content to undergo the effects of his encounters, but wails and accuses every time the effect undergone does not agree with him and reveals his own impotence. For, by lending oneself in this way to whatever encounter in whatever circumstance, believing that with a lot of violence or a little guile, one will always extricate oneself, how can one fail to have more bad encounters than good? How can one keep from destroying oneself through guilt, and others through resentment, spreading one’s own sickness, indigestions, and poisons? In the end, one is unable even to encounter oneself.


More than anything that I read or that friends and family said to me around the time that my marriage was in its final throes, it was this passage that cleared my head and heart and permitted me to see that the marriage had to end. It was, precisely, a “bad encounter” and I was becoming “bad, or servile, or weak, or foolish” by staying in it: “destroying myself through guilt, and others through resentment.” It’s not that others hadn’t said this to me, or that I hadn’t thought this myself. But somehow, through a process that I am still trying to understand, Spinoza’s words were the ones that opened my eyes to this dynamic in my own life.

Of course, for me these moments of clarity seem frustratingly impermanent. That passage gave me the clarity necessary to make a move, to try something different. But in the midst of the clarity that permitted some movement, I also remained unaware of many other sources of suffering and obstacles to joy, and so remained paralyzed and stuck in many other patterns. Some of these would become clear to me on later occasions and more changes would ensue. I am sure that yet others still remain for me to discover, to painfully acknowledge, and to clumsily attempt to address. But none of this clouds the shining clarity of direction and practical impetus that reading provided in that moment, nor does it diminish the importance and value of actions it enabled me to begin to take to change my life and make it more joyful.

I thought about this as I muddled, dazed, through a mire of insecurities and uncertainties in the face of the course I was to teach. I thought more deeply about my experience of reading over the course of the previous year. I recalled the rich banquet of affect those novels had offered me, the shatteringly lucid and practical insights I was surprised to find written by philosophers who, after all, were – like me -- just human beings trying to figure out a confusing existence; I recalled even the fun of reading and writing something intelligent about a sport I loved.

I also thought about the personal pain and difficulty of the year and about how I didn’t know how I’d have made it through, such as I did, without reading. I wondered if this could be my introduction to comparative literature, a course centered on narratives of crisis and how reading such narratives can provide us, in the words of the American philosopher and critic Kenneth Burke, “equipment for living.” I thought about Spinoza’s project: Why couldn’t I say that I had been and was lost and that I used books to comfort me, to challenge me, to help me understand how I’d lost my way and how I might find it again? I certainly couldn’t come up with anything else to say at the time so that’s what I went with.

As it turned out, such thoughts on the basic value of reading for life were a good match for a lecture hall full of eighteen to twenty-two year old college students, most of whom were not literature majors. For them the answers to fundamental questions of value -- “Why read?” “What is this good for?” -- were by no means obvious. These became the guiding questions for the course that, over the next seven fall semesters, would evolve into “Reading to Live.” It was as if I had turned Harold Bloom’s title, How To Read and Why into a question and responded with an emphatic: “Read to live!”

Over the course of those seven semesters, I kept some texts the same because they spoke to me anew each summer as I prepared for the upcoming semester. But others I changed because the particular ways in which I felt lost and the kinds of books that I turned to changed. I tinkered with other aspects of the syllabus, the kinds of written work I’d ask of the students and even the methods of evaluation. No matter what texts I taught and whether or not I repeated them, my lectures were different every fall, in part because my life was different every fall, but in part because I was discovering different thinkers who were shaping and altering the way I thought about even my most cherished texts.

The course grew in size and popularity and the evaluations, for the most part, tended to be enthusiastic. Most of the Comparative Literature majors seemed to appreciate the opportunity to come back to examine afresh their own motivations for majoring in Comparative Literature in the wake of several years of studying literature, criticism, and theory. The non-majors, who made up the vast majority of the enrollments, seemed energized by the invitation to read literary works in relation to their other, more primary, interests in life. I think everyone, myself included, felt braced by the challenges of acknowledging uncertainty in life; inspired by the prospect of reading not so much to resolve that uncertainty (let alone to learn how to classify, judge, or critique literature), but just to go more deeply and openly into that uncertainty and so make it less paralyzing and even, at times, the ground for trying something different. I’m not sure how much any of us really learned about Kafka, or Marx, or Nietzsche, or Puig or any of the authors and texts we studied. But I feel fairly confident that most of us felt transformed by our contact with these texts and, aware of those transformations and inspired to carry them out of the classroom and into our daily lives. “Reading to Live” remains easily the most challenging and satisfying teaching experience I’ve had in my nearly two decades as a university literature professor. (to be continued)

Read more...

Prelude: A Story of Reading to Live (Section 3 of 3)

(Continued from here. Here's the full Table of Contents.)

Let me say a word about this broader conversation about reading and what I believe I have to add to it that hasn’t been said already. The conversation as it stands might be summed up in this way: 1) reading books is happening less and less in our culture, especially among younger generations who have been raised with other media, particularly the internet, that draw more of their attention, energy, and time (sometimes, there is a also subcurrent of worry that when reading does happen it is less and less often books cherished by scholars for bearing the core values of the Western tradition); and 2) reading should happen more and more because a) it is a pleasure; or b) it is an important means of intellectual self-discovery; or c) it is an important source for knowing the things an informed member of our society ought to know to function intelligently.

What I have to say is that yes, certainly, reading should happen more and more carefully, and yes, reading can do all these things, but most of all reading can be more than a pleasure or an intellectual responsibility we owe to ourselves or our society. In fact, in reading we can practice breaking down such dichotomies as pleasure and task, freedom and responsibility, emotion and intellect, self and other or self and world. Reading can be a joy and, as such, can be practice for a joyful life. Or, to state it another way, what I want to add to the conversation is, first, the importance of reading slowly and carefully with a mind and heart open to unforeseen discoveries and transformations; second, the role that affect and emotion play in making reading the pleasure and the source of intellectual self-discovery it can be; and third, that the beneficial effects of reading in this way can be far more profound and far-reaching than merely making us functional citizens. Reading in this way can help us to become more fully functional human beings filled with desire and intimately connected with our power to act creatively.

I believe that the best way to convey what I mean by the value of reading to live is simply by doing it. So most of the rest of this book will consist of eight readings of texts that I have loved that both demonstrate and illustrate the practice of reading to live in several of its many different aspects. It might be helpful if I first offer an overview of the basic features of what I mean by reading to live. I don’t mean this overview to be taken as a formula to be applied. As my own readings will show, reading to live is above all a relational encounter with the words of someone else and entails a willingness to let that encounter shatter formulas and disrupt preconceptions and agendas. It would be more accurate to think of this overview as one of a number of possible ways to distill into a few points what I think the readings I will share have in common with each other.

Reading to live is slow, like a three-foot hike. It is reading that loves words and so it takes its time with them and gets close to them. In so doing, reading to live is mindful and attentive to the myriad sensations and possibilities of meaning offered by the words on the page. Reading to live is likely to entail, at least on occasion, rereading, sometimes many times, sometimes at intervals of only an instant and at other times intervals of years or even decades. At different points in this book I will use adjectives like slow, mindful, attentive, deep, close, and intensive interchangeably to evoke different facets of the pace and quality of attention entailed in reading to live.

I want to emphasize that the call to read closely says nothing about the length of what is read or the length or exhaustiveness of our report to others, if one even emerges, of the reading experience. One can read closely three words of a text or a 600 page work, and the result of that close reading may be a sentence or an entire volume, or even just a passing and unspoken thought. But for the moment, I mean to suggest a reading that is like a kind of stroll. Whether that stroll takes place in a crowded city or an isolated park, in the countryside or through the woods, reading to live is a stroll through a text in which we allow time for noticing, for pausing, for retracing our steps, for following curiosity down what may turn out to be an unfulfilling path, for being moved.

We can drive from St. Louis to Chicago on Interstate 55 and get there in no more than four or five hours. Along the way we’ll see open fields, dotted with trees and, every ten miles or so, an interchange dense with gas stations, mini-marts, and McDonald’s. Or we can drive from St. Louis to Chicago on old US Route 66, which runs more or less alongside Interstate 55. It will take us double the time and along the way we’ll see houses, churches, stalks of corn rising just a few yards from our car window, old dilapidated diners and shiny new ones, sharp curves that we have to slow down to negotiate and small towns that we have to slow down to pass through. At times the road will seem simply to end and we’ll have to pause to figure out how to keep going. Sometimes we’ll go so slow that we notice a sign “Pie $1.99” and that will draw us in and we’ll stop and sit at a counter and have a conversation with a stranger. We branch out.

Similarly, among the effects of the slowness of reading to live is the discovery of complexity and ambiguity at ever more minute scales. The slow pace of reading to live delivers to us, when we are willing, an awareness of the rich complexity and ambiguity of the book, story, language, and words we are reading. And this tremendously enriched experience has a very important effect. By complicating it suspends, our sense of certainty.

Think of the drive to know, with certainty, as that drive to get to Chicago as fast as possible with no detours or distractions. But in the slow time of reading to live it is no longer clear what there is to be certain about, what there is to know, or what knowing would even mean anyway. In reading to live, the imperative to read for knowledge and information gradually yields to the desire to read to sense and learn and feel and think and discover and create. Awareness of sensations and affect flood the space created when we suspend our drive to get to the truth that we might have imagined is held, like water in a pitcher, in the meaningless container of language. We may gradually stop thinking of language as a clear container for truths that are themselves just accurate pictures corresponding to the way things actually are in the world. Gradually, we start to experience words, sensations, feelings, thoughts, and world as all parts or aspects of a single fabric that is being in the world.

In these ways, reading to live is open. By that I mean open to nonsense, paradox, ambiguity, and difficulty, to doubt and uncertainty, to what may sometimes be uncomfortable feelings of pain or sadness or anger, though also, of course, to feelings of love, sympathy, excitement and joy, open to connection with others and the world and open to a tender awareness of the vulnerability that comes with that connection. This openness is facilitated by the slow pace of reading to live, but that slowness is not in itself sufficient to provoke it. Even in a stroll or meandering drive we may find ourselves trying to close our hearts and minds to what we encounter. Therefore reading as openness entails an active effort to recognize those impulses to close ourselves off when they arise and to allow them to pass, even though we may not know what might occur when we do so. As we read with openness we find that the hard boundary between our reading self and the author other begins to slip and blur and perhaps to dissolve entirely. We transform the text and the text transforms us, much as happens when we love.

As we suspend the drive to treat what we read as the repository of a single meaning or as a mere source of information and follow instead the paths of desire, feeling, doubt and curiosity, we may find ourselves led well beyond the text we are reading. We may be led to personal associations such as memories of past experiences, of reading or otherwise. We may be led to think of other texts, by the same author or by authors we know influenced him or her, by critics or scholars writing about the text we are reading, or even texts at first glance seemingly unrelated to the one we are reading. We may be led out of the textual world entirely, into feelings and thoughts about the world we live in, about its natural or social dimensions, about the people in it, strangers or loved ones, about the problems, challenges, and joys of living in this world. Reading to live entails affirming the value of following these paths connecting the text to what is outside the text and making permeable the boundary between the text and our reading of it and the world and our living in it.

In this way, finally, reading to live is a fundamentally inventive, creative activity, in which we take the given materials of text, self, and world and treat them slowly, openly, associatively, so as to at once passively and actively generate new relations within and among them, forging in the process new possible ways of being for all three. This creative dimension of reading I consider to be pragmatic. I mean pragmatic in the widest sense of what may be practical. I do not mean that we read narrowly and hurriedly to find solutions to problems presented within or outside the text. Rather, I mean that in the course of reading we widen the field of our possible practical engagements with ourselves in the world; which is to say, we augment our freedom and our joy.

Let me conclude, finally, with a brief description of the organization of the book. In the remaining readings of this book I hope to develop the account I have already offered of these basic issues and of the role that a certain kind of reading that is also a certain way of living can play in responding to those issues. I’ve divided the book into two parts, with four readings in each. These readings are like lessons in the sense that they are occasions in which, in reading, I have learned something about what reading to live can be. They are, in other words, lessons for me, which I want to share with you.

In Part One, I provide a series of four readings of cherished texts that serve three purposes. First, they are examples of reading to live. Second, they elaborate different dimensions of reading to live. Third, they offer an understanding, from the perspective of reading to live, of the texts themselves. I’ve chosen the texts I will be reading primarily because I love them, because they have called me back for rereadings, and because they have equipped me for living at different points in my life. Of course, the list of texts that have worked this way on me is much longer than what you will find in this book. I’ve narrowed that much longer list to these texts because they are a mix of genres, periods, and traditions, from British adolescent fantasy epic to Latin American short story, from 20th century American to 14th century Korean poetry, and because I find that they provide especially rich material for learning to read to live.

The four readings comprising Part Two put the practice of reading to live to the test, in response to one of the most basic facts of our existence: death. Stephen Batchelor encourages his readers to consider the question: “Since death alone is certain and the time of death uncertain, what should I do?” Such an emphasis on death may seem to run counter to what we usually think of as conducive to the cultivation of joy, not to mention to Spinoza’s own assertion that “a free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death.”

But the point of such a meditation is not to encourage a morbid and paralyzing preoccupation with our own mortality of the sort Spinoza cautioned against. It is, first of all, to clear space for an appropriately vital placement of death within our mental life. The presupposition behind Batchelor’s injunction to consider this question is that, our refusal to acknowledge the fact of death, affectively and intellectually, makes of our lives a kind of continuous, unconscious flight from death. We become driven by the urge to flee from death, which plunges us erratically into behaviors designed to do little more than keep the thought of death out of our awareness.

Considering death in the way that Batchelor encourages is intended to permit us to transform our relationship to death in order to free us to live our lives affirmatively, from the point of view of productive desire (rather than reactive fear). It offers a path, consistent in my opinion with Spinoza’s, for learning how to let go of death and to cultivate freedom and wisdom. But it is important to emphasize this does not mean that Batchelor believes we can come up with an answer to the question. The point is to awaken a felt-sense of what it means to live a life that will stop. I might say that Part Two of Reading to Live offers a series of examples of reading to live a life that will stop.

Read more...

The Introduction to Reading to Live (my book ms. in progress)

Saturday, April 24, 2010


“This book begins with me reading a passage from Spinoza in Ann Arbor, Michigan in 1996.” Clear and certain though it seems, that statement is more complex, mysterious and full of potential than you might think. Keeping that complexity, mystery and potential in mind while we read has everything to do with what I mean by “reading to live.” Let’s examine that simple statement of this book’s point of beginning.

The book you are reading begins here. It’s harder to say where the book I have written begins. In an obvious way, it also begins here, in the same place you’ve begun reading. But in a different sense, a sense that refers to the complex process by which books come to be, it began in another place and time—Ann Arbor, 1996, reading Spinoza. But even that place and time is somewhat arbitrary, selected from any number of possible points of origin I could have chosen. Among other things, the beginning I have chosen involves me reading words written over three hundred years before I read them. So should the beginning be set at the place and time that I read those words, or the place and time that they were written? And of course that author, whose words I was reading at that time, presumably wrote those words down not only as the beginning of writing something but as the end of a long process of reading and thinking.

So, from the beginning, with the beginning, reading and writing get entangled and entangle and confuse time and space, as well as the identities, the selves, of the readers and writers.

Here are some words. I didn’t write them, though I am copying them down now as I read them in a book:

After experience had taught me that all the things which regularly occur in ordinary life are empty and futile, and I saw that all the things which were the cause or object of my fear had nothing good or bad in themselves, except insofar as [my] mind was moved by them, I resolved at last to try to find out whether there was anything which would be the true good, capable of communicating itself, and which alone would affect the mind, all others being rejected – whether there was something which, once found and acquired, would continuously give me the greatest joy, to eternity.

The author of these words, Baruch (or as he is known by the Latin version of his name “Benedict de”) Spinoza, was a young man when he wrote them. We don’t know exactly how young because we don’t know exactly when he wrote them. The most reliable experts consider that he wrote them between late 1656 and late 1659. That would make Spinoza, born in November, 1632, anywhere between 24 and 27 when he set these words down as part of his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, the first work in philosophy that he ever wrote and one that he would never finish.



If that dating is accurate, then Spinoza wrote these words in the wake of what I think anyone would consider a rough year and certainly one that would change dramatically the course of his life. For in July of 1656, Spinoza was subject to a cherem (the highest eccliastical censure for the Jewish community, entailing total exclusion) from the Jewish community in Amsterdam. Spinoza’s family had come to Amsterdam before his birth, fleeing persecution in Portugal. Settled in the tolerant community of Amsterdam, Spinoza’s father had made a good name for himself with an import-export business. By 1656, both his parents having passed away, Spinoza, though a gifted student, was running the family business.

Scholars still don’t know what exactly led to Spinoza’s ostracism. The text of the ban refers to “evil opinions and acts,” “abominable heresies,” and “monstruous deeds,” and also to repeated attempts to get Spinoza to “mend his wicked ways.” But the upshot was the most radical cherem ever issued by the Jewish community in Amsterdam, concluding that “no one should communicate with him, neither in writing, nor accord him any favor nor stay with him under the same roof nor come within four cubits in his vicinity; nor shall he read any treatise composed or written by him.” Spinoza is said to have replied, upon hearing of the cherem, “Very well; this does not force me to do anything that I would not have done of my own accord, had I not been afraid of a scandal.”

Though he remained in Amsterdam for a few years more, eventually he moved to Rjinsburg, then Voorburg, and finally, in 1670, to The Hague. He lived humbly and alone off a modest allowance granted by friends and political allies and from the income he generated as one of the most highly reputed grinder of optical lenses in Europe. Throughout this period he continued to compose philosophical and political works – though the only work of his published in his lifetime, the Theologico-Political Treatise (1670), was published anonymously. The clandestine circulation of his writings drew occasional visitors and correspondents who wished to learn more about, or to challenge, Spinoza’s views. He died without fanfare in 1677, surrounded by a small group of close friends and supporters, probably from the cumulative effects of inhaling glass particles in the course of grinding lenses.

So this is my hero, the hero of Reading to Live. I imagine Spinoza, in his late 20s, sometime in the few years following his shunning, facing a life that looked very different from the one he might have imagined for himself, reading, thinking, reflecting and eventually setting down those words I quoted above. As his biographer, Steven Nadler paraphrases the passage, Spinoza realized that “one must suspend the pursuit of ordinary ‘goods,’ such as honor, wealth, and sensual pleasure” which “reveal themselves, upon reflection, to be fleeting and unstable” and pursue instead “the true good”: “the love of something eternal and immutable” that is “never a source of sadness or danger or suffering, but only of joy.” By all accounts, over the next two decades, Spinoza never wavered from this pursuit, despite poverty and persecution. What he left his friends, and us centuries later, were these words and the other books published after his death and, of course, the example of his own well-lived life.

I first read these words sometime late in 1996, in the midst of a serious personal and professional crisis. But in order to convey the force of their impact on me and the role they played in shaping the experiments and ideas that I’m trying to share in this book, I need first to back up several years, to tell you something about how I wound up there and then, in late 1996, lost in so many ways, reading the first words of Spinoza’s earliest philosophical writing.
I will begin with an autobiographical story, because the central premise of this book is that reading to live can help us in practical ways to live better lives. Demonstrating this requires more than an intellectual argument, however impassioned. It requires sharing with you a concrete account of how reading to live emerged from and responded to real situations in a particular life, in this case my own.

I hope that this allows you to see a real-life example of how reading to live can work prior to trying it out for yourself. But I’m beginning this way also to affirm the fact that reading to live erodes the compartmentalization or fragmentation of our lives and our selves. When we read to live we practice and cultivate our wholeness. Sharing this experience of wholeness (or health: the word derives from older words for wholeness) in my case demands that I write not only as an intellectual, not only as an academic, but as a struggling human being who has happened, for a period of time in his life, to read and think for a living.

As such, I have struggled both professionally and personally with a number of issues that arise in the texts I look at below (as in many other texts). But perhaps the most salient and recurrent among these issues revolve around the experience of vulnerability and intimacy. Vulnerability and intimacy are, in themselves, simply human experiences, not “issues.” However, they have become issues in my life because I simultaneously desire and fear these experiences. I wasn’t always aware of this tension between desire and fear, but since I have become aware of it, I have found it valuable to explore it and try to understand it. I’ve noted that the tension crops up under certain conditions, such as when I find myself unable to orient myself intellectually in a situation, when I find myself removed from the power of my own feelings, desires, or nature, or when I find myself feeling isolated, disconnected from others and the world around me. But these painful experiences of vulnerability and intimacy are not just themes in the books that I will read; nor are they merely issues in my life. Vulnerability and intimacy are, in my opinion, the very stuff of the reading experience.

Reading for me is an experience of not knowing, of struggling to experience and avow my feelings and my desires in relation to a text, of seeking connection and communion. In short, reading is for me practice for a life of vulnerability and intimacy. As I tell my story and share my readings, I want to show how these particular issues of mine have arisen in order to show also how reading and a particular way of approaching reading – what I call “reading to live” – have helped me with those issues.

Reading to live has offered me no permanent or definitive solution. It has just helped in a periodic, almost rhythmic way. That is to say, I live and I lose and I find my way at times for a time, and reading to live has played an integral part in that. But the fact that reading to live has not solved these issues but only raised my awareness of them, and enabled me to accept and cope with them with a bit more grace is no indictment of reading to live. Any practice – therapy, religious worship, exercise, music, or painting or gardening – would be, I believe, subject to the same limitation. The best I believe that any practice of wholeness can give us is a periodic, visceral reminder of our challenges, as well as of our capacities to meet them. (Continued)

Read more...

  © Blogger template The Beach by Ourblogtemplates.com 2009

Back to TOP